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Translated by DeepL, except for Amazigh (ChatGPT) – Follow on smartphone (Do Not Disturb) The Demographics of Brussels, Jan Hertogen Brussels today and in the coming decades (2050) Dear all, Part 1: Brussels, a city like no other And the farmer carried on ploughing. That is the reality for anyone who, for more than twelve years, has been retrieving, confronting and analysing the hard, unyielding data from the National Social Security Office and Statbel. You come up against structures that are deep-seated, painful and uncomfortable. The established academic world, the Brussels universities, think tanks such as BRIO and BISA, the mainstream media and, above all, the political sphere have collectively chosen to turn a blind eye. They look the other way. Is this a form of culpable neglect that erodes the very essence of democracy and brings the future into disrepute? Today, that media silence is being broken. Not with opinions, not with ideological dogmas, but with the bare figures of the 5-digit NACE codes, the demographic data and the social determinants of the election results. Anyone analysing Brussels today comes up against four uncomfortable truths: a reality of political marginalisation affecting more than half of the Brussels population, economic marginalisation, structural underpayment and the skimming off of added value. Let us begin with the foundations of urban democracy. We often hear that Brussels is the beacon of European participation and democracy. The data show the opposite: Brussels finds itself in a de facto state of political exclusion affecting more than half of its population. Today, 52 per cent of the adult population of Brussels is not represented in elections at local, regional and federal levels. In municipalities such as Brussels City and Ixelles, that figure rises to 59 per cent. More than half the city’s population is taken into account when calculating budgets and the number of councillors, yet they have no say in the political debate. Only a compulsory voting system for non-Belgians who have resided in the country for more than five years can remedy this shortcoming. This political exclusion translates, amongst other things, into an economic outflow of its added value through income generation and corporate profits. Every day, 58 per cent of jobs in Brussels are held by commuters – 37 per cent from Flanders and 20 per cent from Wallonia – and this is particularly the case in the higher wage categories. The result? Of the 39 billion euros paid out in Brussels in 2024 in gross wages, 25 billion euros flowed out of the city. The people of Brussels are structurally pushed to the margins of the labour market in their own city, both in terms of employment and wage levels. Unemployment, income support and poverty are their lot, and more so than in other regions, government policy is wreaking havoc. This brings us to the most shocking manifestation of this state of paternalism: the security services. How do you guarantee stability in an urban population that is economically marginalised and, politically, more than half of which is excluded? By establishing a law enforcement force that is sociologically detached from the population. Social Security Office (RSZ) data as at 1 January 2025 show that the proportion of police officers living in Brussels has been falling continuously for twelve years. Today, 81 per cent of the 13,200 police officers working in Brussels commute to the city every day. In 2012, that figure was 72 per cent. According to recent research, 30 per cent of local officers have a migrant background, and the police force reflects only one-third of the population of Brussels. In the fire service, 80 per cent come to work in Brussels. In Brussels, it is a professional force in which not even volunteers are involved. Is it because they are ‘Brussels residents’? And in the Armed Forces, 88 per cent of the 6,489 servicemen and women make their way to Brussels every day to earn a living. And this anomaly is structurally subsidised. A local police officer who commutes earns more than their Brussels-based colleague who lives in the city; the ‘Brussels bonus’ is a well-known form of discrimination against a Brussels resident who works in their own city. Policy rewards police and other professions based outside Brussels, rather than strengthening local roots. And what of the much-discussed unification of police zones? This risks only exacerbating recruitment discrimination through economies of scale and a reduction in the influence of Brussels politicians. Ladies and gentlemen, this system is not stable. It is a recipe for implosion. Whilst federal policymakers are preparing to make further cuts to social security and livelihood security – which will hit the people of Brussels particularly hard – the soil chooses its own seed and the parties that best represent its interests. Look at the electoral undercurrent. The 52 per cent who today cast blank votes in Brussels, fail to turn out or are excluded, help to shape the real prospect of change, even in the short term. And the seed will continue to germinate through an education system that is becoming ever more diverse. By 2030, this demographic and social reality could already translate into a political landslide. The PVDA/PTB is polling at around 30 per cent. A veteran, shaped by the reality of the ‘Klein Chicago’ youth centre and Brussels-West, may well take the reins as Minister-President of this city. And then the balance of power will shift dramatically. The party that represents the entire population and takes responsibility for people and society could suddenly be entrusted with the operational management of the capital. It would then also immediately manage the vital infrastructure of the European Union and NATO. One might ask whether the external police and military forces are already physically present today out of concern for this possible demographic and political correction of history by the population. The current federal model uses Brussels as a cash cow. Along the growing commuter corridor, the higher incomes from Brussels jobs are skimmed off and spent in the other regions. Brussels residents are encouraged to seek employment in other regions, primarily Flanders, whilst civil service and senior executive posts are reserved for commuters, including through family recruitment – a long-standing sore point. A reorientation of the current centralising policy is necessary. There is a need for institutional reform that gives Brussels the opportunity to develop its full potential within an equal regional framework. Greater autonomy in the areas of security policy, civil service recruitment, education and employment is an obvious step. The incentive system could be reversed: housing and bonuses for those who live and work in the city and embrace its diversity. Ultimately, the people will choose the party that serves them. Is it not time for this colloquium, the academic world, policymakers, politicians and the media to come together and open their eyes to the uncomfortable truth of the figures laid out here today? For further analysis of all this data, broken down by municipality, province, region and Belgium, see the links below.
This brings us to the basic maths of the future. For anyone who thinks that the current federal model of exclusion and economic skimming will hold up in the coming decades is ignoring the demographic dynamics that are already unfolding inexorably today, heading towards 2050. Looking a quarter of a century ahead is not mere guesswork in sociology. It is the sum of the population composition, births and deaths, net migration and the movements that are already evident today in the actual figures and forecasts. Take a look at the curve: at the 1958 World’s Fair, 7 per cent of Brussels’ residents had a migrant background. By 1970, this figure had risen to 20 per cent, and after three decades of intensive relocation and migration, the decline in population was only halted in 2000, by which time half of Brussels’ residents had a migration background. Today, that figure stands at 86 per cent, including the grandchildren of foreigners who have become Belgian citizens. And by 2050, 95 per cent of the Brussels population will have a migrant background. This is not an ideological or wishful claim; it is demographic mathematics. Brussels is the city with the strongest growth in the proportion of people with a migrant background in the world, which has taken place in an exceptionally peaceful manner. Let us state the facts clearly and without hesitation. What took place in Brussels was not a ‘replacement of the population’. It was a depopulation. A historic exodus that began in 1970 and lasted for no less than three decades . It was international immigration that slowed this demographic decline, only bringing it to a definitive halt around the year 2000. Let us face the demographic reality: without migration and its descendants, the Brussels Region would today have fewer than 200,000 inhabitants. And the truly divisive truth lies in the socio-economic transformation of that population. Whilst the clichéd image of Brussels remains stubbornly entrenched in poverty, deprivation and insecurity, an educational and social transformation of unprecedented proportions is taking place. Over the next 24 years, two generations of primary and secondary school leavers will move on to higher education and the labour market. This represents half of the working-age population that will have been replaced by 2050, whilst a third generation will still be at school. Based on current trends in educational attainment, within 25 years three-quarters of Brussels residents aged between 25 and 64 will have a higher education qualification, compared with two-thirds in Flanders and just over half in Wallonia. Nevertheless, Brussels will remain Belgium’s demographic driving force. Over the last 35 years, the number of Brussels residents who have moved to other regions is equal to the current population of Brussels, namely 1.255 million. This is, in fact, the main reason why there was virtually no population growth in 2025, as 43,339 Brussels residents have sought their future in other regions. And that figure is more likely to grow than to stagnate in the future. The historical differences between Brussels’ municipalities in terms of education and employment will fade away due to internal migration; by 2025, 63,874 Brussels residents had already moved to another Brussels municipality, including from poorer to wealthier municipalities. And the teaching profession is set to undergo a genuine transformation over the next quarter of a century. The proportion of teachers with a migrant background will, after all, increase significantly, whilst respecting women’s choice of attire. Currently, 53 per cent of teaching staff commute to Brussels every day; that, too, will change. Brussels will remain an irresistible magnet for top international talent. And because of these dynamics, the traditional political elite in Flanders is facing its greatest historical paradox. For which education system offers the quality and prospects that this highly educated, diverse group craves? The Dutch-speaking education system. Whether traditional politics realises it, creates the conditions for it or works against it, the share of Dutch-language education will, as in the past, see steady growth in Brussels. The calculation is as simple as it is surprising: by 2050, half of the Brussels population will have a Dutch-speaking and therefore ‘Flemish’ background if the supply of schools keeps pace with demand. By then, there will no longer be any question of an ‘originally Flemish background’ . The population of Brussels will undergo a sociological and cultural ‘re-Flemishisation’. For the ever-shrinking group of Brussels residents with an originally French-speaking background, this will no longer be a problem. Not because the traditional Flemish person is reclaiming the city, but because a super-diverse younger population is adopting the Flemish language and culture as the most important means of social mobility and societal success. The Flemish presence in Brussels will either be diverse or it will not exist at all. Until the early nineteenth century, the typical Brussels resident was mainly a Flemish person. Following the subsequent process of Frenchification, since 1970 they have, together with the original French speakers, formed a minority in Brussels. But through Dutch-language education, the balance is shifting. The ‘Flemish presence’, in its new, diverse and Dutch-speaking composition, is becoming the glue that holds the Brussels Region together – economically, politically and culturally. And the language spoken at home will, contrary to the concerns raised about it, remain an important factor in the rich multilingualism of the people of Brussels. As an ‘expert by experience’, the Flemish resident of Brussels will be best placed to show the way to the various ‘minorities’. This has major institutional consequences for ‘Flemish’ language policy. The current ‘restrictions’ on Dutch-language education in Brussels will be removed in the forthcoming state reforms. The current exclusion of Brussels residents from civil service posts in their own city will be phased out. Brussels will develop into the European metropolis that it essentially is, with Flemish and Walloon Brabant serving as a powerful, integrated hinterland that cooperates in the areas of the economy, prosperity, welfare and culture. Automation and AI could turn the Brussels metropolis into the Silicon Valley on the Senne. This greater interaction with the hinterland and the maximisation of Brussels’ educational standards will cause economic activity and the influence of the international and financial institutions in the capital to rise sharply . By 2050, Brussels’ employment rate will be the highest of the three regions. The commuting pattern will shift. And what about another uncomfortable statistic: crime? The interesting and under-explored crime statistics from the police paint a picture of who suffers most from crime. Not, as is often portrayed in the media, the level of criminality amongst the population. Only one in three police officers has a migrant background, and these are in lower-ranking police roles with no career prospects. This imbalance will be completely reversed by 2050. Recruitment will be local and representative and will be able to count on the full cooperation of the population, with young people at the forefront. This will ensure genuine security and a deep-seated sense of safety. A diverse police force that reflects the people of Brussels will strike at the heart of criminal networks. Migration and asylum are also indicators of the historical necessity for the city to survive. Without migration, Brussels would be a dead city. Migration remains a key to securing the future, including for Brussels. Perhaps a topic for a future symposium. The political transition that Brussels, more than any other region, is facing shifts the focus away from the traditional political centres and the (international) security services. The political landscape and the security architecture of Brussels will be reshaped by the democratic voice of the people of Brussels, who, through the acquisition of nationality and the expansion of Dutch-language education, will increasingly have a ‘Flemish’ background. It is not Brussels that needs Flanders, but Flanders that needs Brussels. Ladies and gentlemen, I shall conclude. Brussels is not a cash cow. Brussels is not an occupied territory that needs to be kept in check by commuting civil servants and military personnel. Brussels, a highly educated, super-diverse and self-assured metropolis, will, through its schools, anchor itself in its historical, Flemish background in order to secure its international future, which will benefit the whole of Belgium. The data do not lie; demography, the foundation of every social science as Professor Frans Van Mechelen suggested as early as 1968 in his course on demography, is mathematically sound. Brussels is the future of Belgium. Thank you very much. Jan Hertogen, sociologist
www.npdoc.be/brussel
- The speech can be read on this website. Links to data and sources: updates are currently being prepared or can be requested.
www.npdoc.be/migratieachtergrond
- by region, province, municipality
For comments, questions and
suggestions:
jan@hertogen.be
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